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Abstract—Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an alternative
key distribution technique that, unlike the classical approaches,
can provide unconditionally secure keys for data communications
over public communication networks. The European projet Sec-
oqc (Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography)
aims at developing a global network for unconditionally secure
key distribution. This paper specifies the major elements of the
transport layer protocols of the Secoqc QKD network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Implementation of many cryptographic schemes, such as
encryption and authentication algorithms, rely on a proper
key distribution scheme among the legitimate communicating
parties. The strength of a cryptographic algorithm is directly
linked to the difficulty of obtaining the secret keys by adver-
saries; key distribution schemes can be identified as one of the
most sensitive parts of the security systems in communication
networks. It is highly desirable to develop unconditionally
secure key distribution systems, i.e., adversaries cannot obtain
shared secrets regardless of their computing resources.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), developed in 1984 by
Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard [1], based on some
earlier ideas of Stephen Wiesner [2], is an alternative solution
for key distribution. Relying on the principles of quantum
mechanics, a basic QKD system, as shown in Fig. 1, can
establish a shared secret with unconditional security between
two communicating parties, namely Alice and Bob [3][4].
Security of QKD relies on the fact that it is impossible to
gain information about non-orthogonal quantum states without
causing detectable perturbation [5]. This implies that Alice
and Bon in Fig. 1 eliminate the compromised portion of
the information that they exchange through quantum channel
and establish unconditionally secure keys. Regardless of her
computing resources, Eve cannot obtain useful information
about the established shared secret between Alice and Bob.
Practical deployment of QKD systems is currently limited
by few technical challenges. QKD links can only operate
over point-to-point connections. Furthermore, the current QKD
links have limited key generation rate and cannot be de-
ployed over arbitrarily long distances. The development of
QKD network architectures appears from this perspective
as a necessary step towards effective deployment of QKD.
A network of QKD devices can significantly address these
problems by: 1) extending the range through chains of QKD
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Fig. 1. A basic QKD system
devices; 2) improving utilization through resource sharing; and
3) providing point to multi-point communication structures.
The objective of the Secoqc project is to develop the
first European QKD network for long-range high security
communications. The Secoqc QKD network is built based
on trusted classical relay nodes. The main originality of the
Secoqc project, with respect to previous works, relies on
the fact that we have opted for a dedicated key distribution
network infrastructure that we call network of secrets. The
functionality of the network of secrets is solely to forward
session keys among communicating application pairs. The
Secoqc QKD network is characterized by its dedicated link,
network, and transport layers. The specific design concept of
the Secoqc QKD network is the implementation of local key
stores. QKD devices operate at their maximum key generation
rate, and the surplus, when the traffic over a link is light, is
stored in local key stores for future, when the traffic over
the link is high. A pair of application programs access the
network by connecting to a pair of network nodes. When
one of the application programs requests a session key, the
corresponding node generates a random number and forwards
it through the QKD network to the other application program
which is connected to another network node. The session
keys are encrypted (one time padded) using the local keys
over individual links in their way towards their destination
nodes. To accomplish the task of key forwarding, similar to
the conventional communication networks, a set of properly
designed network architectures and protocols are required. The
overall architecture and some components of the communica-
tion protocol stack of the Secoqc QKD network are specified
in [6]-[8]. In this paper, we propose the general specification
of the transport layer protocols for the Secoqc QKD network.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. An overview
of the architecture of the Secoqc QKD network is given in
Section II. A logical view of the QKDTL is given in Section
II. The concepts of QKDTL connection setup and termination
are explained in Section III. In Section IV the concept of ad-
mission control is discussed. In Section V key synchronization
and end-to-end reliability measures are specified. Flow and
congestion control issues are addressed in Section VI.
A. Architecture of the Secoqc QKD Network
The architecture of the Secoqc QKD network is shown in
Fig. 2. The network consists of Quantum BackBone (QBB)
nodes that are connected by QBB links. QBB nodes are similar
to routers in the conventional communication networks. A
QBB node consists of multiple basic QKD devices. QBB links
may be a single, as depicted in Fig. 1, or a combination of
multiple parallel QKD links. QBB nodes are located inside
secure and trusted sites. Users may access to the network
through QBB or Quantum Access Node (QAN)nodes. A QAN
node is a QBB node with limited routing functionalities, while
it is more specialized in providing access point to many users.
A QAN node is connected to a QBB node with a secure
connection, e.g., a QKD link.
The application programs who intend to have secure com-
munications over a public network, such as the Internet, use the
QKD network for establishing unconditionally secure session
keys which can be used for different cryptographic purposes.
It has to be emphasized that, in a typical scenario, the QKD
network does not carry real data traffic among application
programs. The sole responsibility of the QKD network is to
distribute secret keys with unconditional security. The main
data communications are performed over the existing public
networks such as the Internet. In a typical scenario, upon
the request of an application program, namely the client, the
ingress QBB or QAN node, which is the access point for
the client application program, examines the possibility of
providing a path to the requested destination. The destination
application program, namely the server, obviously, must also
be connected to another QBB or QAN node, which is referred
to by the egress QBB or QAN node. If the QKD network
has enough resources, the ingress node accepts the request;
otherwise, the request is rejected. If the path is established
successfully, the ingress QBB or QAN node generates random
session keys and forwards them through the QKD network
to the egress QBB/QAN node, which delivers the keys to
the server application program. In its way through the QKD
network the session keys are secured through hop-by-hop
one-time-padding using the local keys. Local keys, that are
theoretically secure, are established via QBB links between
adjacent QBB nodes. QBB nodes are located inside private and
secure sites. Regarding that the local keys are unconditionally
secure and that the QBB nodes are inside secure locations,
we can conclude that the QKD network can be used for
distribution of unconditionally secure session keys. Note that
the QBB links, which connect adjacent QBB nodes, are
deployed over potentially unsecured locations; thus, they are
vulnerable to different types of security threats. Furthermore,
redundant paths over the QKD network can be utilized by the
routing and forwarding protocols to combat Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks.
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Fig. 2. The structure of the Secoqc QKD network
II. OVERVIEW OF THE QKDTL
As specified in [8], the communication protocol stack of
the Secoqc QKD network has a layered architecture, which is
shown in Fig. 3. The protocol stack consists of four layers:
1) QKD Link Layer (QKDLL); 2) QKD Network Layer
(QKDNL); 3) QKD Transport Layer (QKDTL); and 4) QKD
Application Layer (QKDAL). The QKDTL complements the
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Fig. 3. The communications protocol stack of the QKD network
network services by providing connection oriented reliable and
synchronized key delivery for the client applications. This
guarantees that the application pairs at the two ends of a
QKDTL connection to receive keys with proper sequence and
length information. Multiplexing and demultiplexing of the
incoming/outgoing traffic at ingress and egress QBB nodes is
also performed by the QKDTL. In addition, QKDTL maintains
stability of the QKD network through flow and congestion
control.
The logical architecture of the QKDTL, their internal,
and external interactions are shown in Fig. 4. Admission
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Fig. 4. The logical components of the QKDTL
control processes the connection request from the application
programs and based on the status of network decides either
to accept or reject the request. If the connection request is
accepted, the connection management modules establish a
QKDTL connection between the corresponding QBB nodes.
A QKDTL connection controls transmission flow of session
keys between ingress and egress QBB nodes.
All functionalities of the QKDTL are performed by ex-
changing QKDTL packets, Fig. 5, between a pair of end
applications. A QKDTL packet contains the following fields:
1) Client and Server numbers uniquely identifies a QKDTL
connection; 2) Sequence and ACK numbers identify a single
data or acknowledgment during the life time of a connection;
3)Data Offset indicates the number of 32-bit words in the
header; 4) Reserved bits are for future extensions; 5) flag
bits (URG, ACK, and etc. ) determines the type of a packet;
6) Window specifies the size of the sender’s and receiver’s
window.
III. CONNECTION SETUP AND TERMINATION
As mentioned earlier the QKDTL provides the interface
layer for the application programs who might use the QKD
network. A typical scenario is illustrated in Fig. 6. The
sequence diagram of the entire process and the QKDTL packet
are shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 6. Initialization of a QKDTL connection in three phases
A client application program that is located inside a private
network, where there exists a QBB or QAN node, intends
to establish a secure connection over a public network with
a server application. Note that the server application is also
located inside another private network who is connected
to another QBB or QAN node. As a precondition, in the
registration phase, the server application establishes a TCP
connection to the corresponding QBB node and registers in
the QKD network. Upon the registration of the server, the
corresponding QBB node assigns a server ID. The server ID
is composed of the QBB node address and a 16-bit unique
number. The registration information then is flooded across
the entire QKD network.
In the connection phase, a client application connects to its
corresponding QBB node through a TCP connection. At this
stage the corresponding QBB node associates an application
ID with the client program. The client number is composed
of the corresponding QBB node’s address and a 16-bit unique
number. Note that, unlike the server ID, the client ID does
not need to be flooded through the entire network. Next, the
client application can send a request for establishing a QKDTL
connection with an already registered server application. This
process is completed through a 3-way handshake process.
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Fig. 7. QKDTL connection setup: sequence diagram
First, the ingress QBB node sends a QKDTL SYN message
as shown in Fig. 8. The egress QBB node replies the SYN
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Fig. 8. QKDTL SYN packet
message by a SYN ACK message as shown in Fig. 9. A final
ACK message from the client will complete establishment of
the QKDTL connection. A connection is uniquely identified
by the client and the server numbers. Note that if the same
client opens another QKDTL connection with the same server,
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Fig. 9. QKDTL SYN ACK packet
the initiating QBB node, ingress node, assigns a different
client number to the new connection. The server number for
each connection is also a unique number. Upon the successful
establishment of the QKDTL connection, the client application
establishes a conventional TCP connection with the server
application over the public network.
In the secure communication phase, the client and the server
applications may request for session keys. To efficiently utilize
the QKD network services, the connection manager, who
receives a key request, generates a random number with the
maximum QKDTL packet size and forwards it through the
QKD network to the QBB node at the other end of a QKDTL
connection. If the packet verification is passed successfully,
the connection manager at the receiver side delivers the packet
to the corresponding application and sends an ACK message
back, indicating the correct reception of a certain packet which
is identified by a unique sequence number. The sequence
number is assigned by the connection manager at the initiator
QBB node side. Note that at this phase, the initiator QBB
node could be either the server side or the client side QBB
node. When the QKDTL packet is acknowledged it can be
delivered to the application program who has initiated the
key request. Note that the QKDTL packet usually is a big
chunk of key materials, around 64 kb, that may be broken
into small pieces depending on the application. To improve
the efficiency, each ACK packet may acknowledge multiple
previously received packets. This will improve robustness of
ACK messages. In the case that an ACK message is lost due to
network congestion, the initiator connection manager does not
drop the packet immediately, waiting for the upcoming ACK
messages. After a reasonable timeout period, the connection
manager at the initiator side assumes that the packet has been
dropped due to network congestion and drops the packet. Note
that the QKDTL connection is a full-duplex connection, i.e.,
both the client and the server may initiate a key request.
A secure communication must be properly terminated. Ei-
ther client or server may initiate the termination process. For a
successful termination: 1) the TCP connection between client
and server must be terminated; 2) the QKDTL connection
between the ingress and egress QBB nodes is closed; 3)
the TCP connection between client and the corresponding
QBB node must be terminated. The sequence diagram for
connection termination are shown in Fig. 10 (initiated by the
client) and Fig. 11 (initiated by server). If a server terminates
a connection, the TCP connection between the server and its
corresponding QBB node is not terminated. Note that, similar
to the conventional TCP, each connection termination entails
4 QKDTL Messages.
Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show the state diagrams of the client
side and server side connections, respectively.
IV. ADMISSION CONTROL
The purpose of admission control is to prevent system
overload that might cause significant performance degradation.
A meticulous integration of admission control with access
control and dynamic resource allocation policies is still a
major challenge in implementing guaranteed QoS services in
shared systems. The practical approach in public networks is
to monitor network resources, spot bottlenecks, and increase
the capacity of the overloaded devices. This might not be
economically feasible for the QKD networks. Thus, a heuristic
admission control might be a considerable option. Although
such a scheme cannot be a robust base for guaranteeing QoS,
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Fig. 10. QKDTL connection termination sequence diagram: client initiated
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it mitigates frequent congestions by limiting the number of
concurrent connections through the QKD network.
Admission control of the QKD network can be performed
during connection setup phase, when the QKDTL SYN and
QKDTL SYN ACK messages are exchanged between ingress
and egress QBB nodes. The payload of a SYN message,
as shown in Fig. 8, contains the average required key rate
requirement of the connection. Each QBB node in the forward
path examines the SYN message; if the rate requirement
cannot be supported the QBB node simply drops the SYN
packet. Similarly, the payload of SYN ACK, ash show in Fig.
9, packet contains the required rate for ACK messages, which
can be calculated by the egress QBB node. The QBB nodes in
the reverse path examine the rate requirements in the reverse
path, and drop the SYN ACK packet if the requested rate
cannot be supported.
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V. RELIABLE AND SYNCHRONIZED KEY DELIVERY
The QKD network protocols do not ensure reliable delivery
of session keys. It is also important for an application pair
to have a consistent numbering scheme for session keys in
order to guarantee proper consumption of the session keys.
To avoid the complexity of the network protocols of the
QKD network, these important problems are addressed by the
QKDTL protocol.
For key synchronization, each session key is assigned a
unique sequence number. The initial value will be set during
the connection establishment phase. Each session key is a big
chunk of random bits, e.g., 64 KB, that may be consumed
by the application programs in smaller blocks. For proper
consumption of a session key, the application program may
define a local pointer, as shown in Fig 14, to keep track of the
consumed bits.
The proposed approach to enable reliable key deliver is
based on feeding back the ACK packets by the receiver for
successfully received packets. The transmitted session keys
will be placed in transitional buffers. When the acknowl-
edgment of a session key is received, it will be delivered
to the application program and removed from the transition
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Fig. 14. A session key index and the local pointer indicating used bits
buffer. The acknowledgment scheme of the receiver is slightly
different than that of the TCP. Upon successful reception of
a session key, the receiver node will send an ACK packet
to acknowledge the current and some arbitrary number of
the previously received session keys. Acknowledging multiple
packets can improve the impacts of lost ACK packets at
the cost of larger ACK packets. However, since the ACK
packets are not encrypted (but must be authenticated), their
size does not increase key consumption. Note that, unlike
TCP, there is no need for retransmission of the same packet
after ACK timeout. In the case that a session key doesn’t get
acknowledged for a relatively long period of time the sender
node removes it from the transitional buffer.
VI. CONGESTION AND FLOW CONTROL
Congestion may occur communication networks when cer-
tain network resources are loaded beyond their capacity,
causing packet dropping by the congested network devices.
Congestion control mechanisms play important role in main-
taining network stability and achieving a high utilization of
the network resources. There are two principle approaches
to reduce the probability of congestion or recover from a
congested state: 1) resource reservation and traffic policing; 2)
end-to-end congestion control. Although resource reservation
looks a natural solution, its implementation incurs significant
signaling overhead and complexity of the network protocols. In
end-to-end approaches, such as the TCP congestion control, a
sender node dynamically adjusts its transmission rate based on
its observations of the network through the delayed or missing
acknowledgement packets. End-to-end congestion control is
simpler and more scalable than reservation based approaches.
Furthermore, considering the variable nature of the network
traffic, reservation may not be the best way of resource
utilization. End-to-end congestion control is our choice as the
current Seqoqc network protocols do not support reservation
mechanisms.
A. Flow Control
For transport layer connections, a sender normally sends
multiple packets before receiving an ACK to reduce the idle
time of a connection as the round trip time is significantly
larger than the transmission time of a single packet. However,
this might lead to a situation that a fast sender overruns a
slower receiver. Flow control is implemented in the transport
layer of communication protocols to mitigate this problem. It
is usually implemented through a sliding window mechanism
which restricts the maximum number of packets that a sender
can send before receiving an ACK. The limit is defined by
a window size variable which is advertised by the receiver
node during a connection setup. A sender must never increase
its window size beyond the maximum advertised size by the
receiver node. However, the transmission window size may
be reduced by the sender due to network congestion (next
subsection).
The sliding window mechanism of QKDTL is illustrated
by an example in Fig. 15. In this example, the window size
is 4; the sender sends 4 packets in row and waits for the first
ACK. The arrival of an ACK triggers transmission of another
packet. Note that there are always at most 4 unacknowledged
packets in the sender side. Each ACK packet also contains
acknowledgement for multiple packets.
B. TCP Congestion Control
Congestion occurs when some network links are loaded
beyond their capacity. In such cases, network devices, i.e.,
routers, may drop packets as they run out of buffering memory.
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Fig. 15. Flow control through sliding window
Thus, the transmission rate of the connections who share the
congested link should be reduced to let the congested link
recover back to a normal state. Congestion control is usually
implemented in transport layer. A proper congestion control
policy is the key factor of stable and efficient operation of
packet switched networks. It is also an extremely complex
issue as it entails dynamic collaboration of globally distributed
and autonomous users. In this subsection we give an overview
of the TCP congestion control mechanism; then, we specify
that of the QKDTL.
The principle of the TCP congestion control is to allow
a sender node to increase its transmission rate independently
and react to observable congestion events which are learned
through the pace of the ACK packets. The basic scheme, that
has evolved by several later improvements, is called Additive
Increase and Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) [9] as shown in
Fig. 16. In this scheme, a sender node controls its transmission
rate using a variable, Congestion Window, (cwnd). Note that
cwnd is a dynamic variable overriding the advertised window
size that restricts the number of packets that can be sent prior
to receiving an ACK. Starting from an initial window size,
usually 1, the sender increases cwnd at a certain pace, e.g., 1
each Round Trip Time (RTT). The linear increase continues
until the point that the receiver observes a missing ACK
(timeout); then, assuming that the event indicates a congestion,
the cwnd is immediately halved to help the congested link
recover back to a normal state. Note that the upper bound of
cwnd is defined by the processing capability of the receiver
node which is defined at the time of connection setup. AIMD
is unnecessarily slow when the value of cwnd is small, e.g.,
in the beginning of a connection. This is know as the slow
start problem. An improved version of TCP, known as Tahoe
[10], proposes an exponential initial increase until a certain
slow start threshold (ssthresh), i.e., cwnd is doubled each
RTT. After ssthres, cwnd is increased linearly. The initial value
of ssthresh may be set equal to the advertised window size,
the subsequent values are set to the half of cwnd when a
missing ACK is observed. Further major improvements of TCP
includes Fast Retransmit, Fast Recovery, Modified Slow Start
(TCP Reno [10]), TCP NewReno [11], SACK TCP [12], TCP
Vegas [12], and TCP BIC [14].
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Fig. 16. Additive Increase and Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD)
For the QKD network, adopting a TCP-like congestion
control might not be efficient as frequent packet dropping
events, which is normal for TCP, can waste significant amount
of local key materials. Therefore, we intend to take advantage
of the specific characteristics of the QKD network to propose
a congestion control policy that allows efficient utilization of
network resources while minimizing packet dropping events
by predicting and avoiding possible congestion events. The
main elements of the proposed congestion control mechanism
are listed in the following:
 Similar to TCP AIMD, the sender changes the size of
cwnd additively and halves it in response to ACK timeout.
 There is single-bit congestion flag, CON, in the QKDTL
packet which will be set by the intermediate QBB nodes
when the level of the key store on the next hop of a packet
reaches below a certain threshold. This will signal the
receiver of a predicted congestion event in the forward
path from the sender. Thus, the receiver node deliberately
postpones sending the next ACK for a random period
larger than RTT causing a timeout and multiplicative rate
reduction at the sender side.
 A proper estimation of RTT is essential for proper func-
tion of QKDTL. The both sides of a QKDTL connection
implement a moving average filter to estimate RTT as
follows.
RTT (k) = (1  1
C
)RTT (k   1) + 1
C
rtt(k); (1)
where RTT (k) denotes the new estimate of RTT, rtt(k)
is the new measurement of RTT, and C is the time
constant of the filter.
 A receiver must set the CON field of the postponed
ACK packets. The instantaneous RTT measured from
postponed ACKs will not be used by the sender to update
the average value of RTT.
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